Fordham Law Review
Volume 68

Issue 1

Article 6

1999

State Sovereign Immunity and the False Claims Act: Respecting
the Limitations Created by the Eleventh Amendment upon the
Federal Courts
James Y. Ho

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James Y. Ho, State Sovereign Immunity and the False Claims Act: Respecting the Limitations Created by
the Eleventh Amendment upon the Federal Courts, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 189 (1999).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

State Sovereign Immunity and the False Claims Act: Respecting the Limitations
Created by the Eleventh Amendment upon the Federal Courts
Cover Page Footnote
In Deo Speramus

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/6

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FALSE CLAIMS
ACT: RESPECTING THE LIMITATIONS CREATED BY THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT UPON THE FEDERAL COURTS
James Y Ho*
INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the False Claims Act ("FCA" or "Act") in 1863

as a whistleblower statute.' The Act provides that a person having
knowledge of fraud perpetrated upon the federal government2 may
bring suit against the defrauder on behalf of himself and on behalf of
the United States By doing so, the whistleblower is deemed to be a
qui tam relator The plaintiff-whistleblower receives a portion of any
amount ultimately recovered by the federal government, regardless of
whether the relator prosecutes the suit or the United States takes over
prosecution To date, about two billion dollars have been recovered
under the Act and approximately sixteen percent of that two billion
dollars has been handed over to the whistleblower

Procedurally, a person with knowledge of a fraud being perpetrated
upon the government files a lawsuit in federal court! The complaint
* In Deo Speramus.

1. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (amended and codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
2. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(7) (listing ways in which a person may be held liable to the United States).
3. See id. § 3730(b).
4. Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
seipso, which translates into "he who as much for the king as for himself." See Note,
The History and Development of Qui Tani, 1972 Wash. U. LQ. 81, 83 (1972) [hereinafter History and Development] (citing 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 160 (1st ed. 1768)). Because the FCA allows plaintiffs to sue on behalf of
the United States as well as for themselves, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), these actions are
often known as qui tam actions. Plaintiffs in a qui tam action are known as relators.
See United States ex reL Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 980 F. Supp. 864, 866 n.2 (N.D.
Tex. 1997).
5. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
6. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Fried Frank Qui Tam PageFCA Statistics (last modified Jan. 13, 1999) <http'J/vv.ffhsj.com/quitamI
fcastats.htm>.
7. Although the FCA does not explicitly limit jurisdiction solely to federal
courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1355 confers original jurisdiction "exclusive of the courts of the
States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress." 28
U.S.C. § 1355 (1994). Because the FCA makes any person who defrauds the govern-
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is filed in camera and is kept under seal for at least sixty days.' During
those sixty days, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has the opportunity to investigate the claim.9 Within the sixty-day period, the DOJ
may elect to intervene and take over the lawsuit. 10 If it does not intervene, then the whistleblower may proceed with the lawsuit." The
amount of the reward that qui tam plaintiffs may receive is based on a
sliding scale, depending on how much work the relator puts
into the
2
litigation and how early, if ever, the government intervenes.1
When the party accused of defrauding the government is a state, the
state may attempt to dismiss the lawsuit by asserting its sovereign immunity. 13 The Eleventh Amendment generally limits the jurisdiction
ment liable "for a civil penalty," § 1355 seems to apply. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). But
see United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989) (finding that the FCA is a remedial, not a punitive, statute). Additional support for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts appears in the procedural requirements of the FCA, which are all federal.
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) ("A summons as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure shall be issued by the appropriate district court and served at any place
within or outside the United States."). One court disagreed with this analysis and
held that states have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts. See United States
ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., 797 F. Supp. 624, 632-33 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (reasoning
that because the civil penalties under the FCA resemble liquidated damages more
than the fines, forfeitures, and penalties covered by § 1355, § 1355's general grant of
jurisdiction does not apply); see also United States ex rel. Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 370, 374-75 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (adopting the
Hartigan court's conclusion for the purpose of determining whether the case should
be dismissed on res judicata grounds); United States ex rel. Hindo v. University of
Health Sciences/The Chicago Med. Sch., No. 91 C 1432, 1993 WL 512609, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 8, 1993) (same). But see John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions 5-65 to 5-66 (Supp. 1999) (criticizing the decision in Hartigan as misinterpreting
the FCA and its legislative history).
8. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
9. See id.; see also S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 24 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289 (explaining that the sixty-day time period is "intended to
allow the Government an adequate opportunity to fully evaluate the private enforcement suit and determine both if that suit involves matters the Government is already
investigating and whether it is in the Government's interest to intervene and take
over the civil action").
10. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Pursuant to § 3730(b)(3), the DOJ often obtains
long extensions of time during which the complaint remains under seal. See Boese,
supra note 7, at 4-101.
11. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
12. See id. § 3730(d).
13. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
162 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999); United States ex
rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct.
2387 (1999); United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 104
F.3d 1453, 1457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 916 (1997); United States ex rel. Fine
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds,72
F.3d 740 (1995); United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. &
Tech. Inst, 999 F. Supp. 78, 83 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 98-5133,
98-5149 & 98-5150, 1999 WL 178713 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 1999); United States ex rel.
Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 980 F. Supp. 864, 870 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, 171 F.3d
279 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. 730 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D.
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of federal courts over suiits when the state is a defendant."4 The most
significant exception to states' broad immunity occurs when an individual sues a state to vindicate a right' recognized by federal common
or statutory law. 16 According to the Supreme Court, this exception
exists because the Fourteenth Amendment, which the states ratified
after the Eleventh Amendment, necessarily circumscribes some of the

states' sovereign powers.17
Seminole Tribe v. Florida8 represents the Supreme Court's current
position on the issue of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity. The Court in Seminole Tribe held that although sovereign

immunity cannot be abrogated by an act of Congress pursuant to its

Article I powers, 19 Congress has the power to do so under its Fourteenth Amendment powers. 2 The Court parried the dissent's concerns that the majority's holding would make it impossible to ensure
state compliance with federal law. It noted that its decision did not
affect the United States's authority to sue states,21 or the right of indiColo.1990).
14. See generally Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-70 (1997) (describing the extent of federal courts' jurisdiction over suits against states). If the
plaintiff of the suit is either the United States or another state, however, sovereign
immunity is waived implicitly because the surrender is "inherent in the constitutional
compact." Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,781 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress
could, under the Fourteenth Amendment, abrogate state sovereign immunity). In
such cases, the state is still not the party subject to suit; technically, the state official
who violated the plaintiff's rights is sued. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156-60
(1908). Even in these cases, the plaintiff may sue only for injunctive relief, which
must also be prospective in nature. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,677 (1974).
16. In these cases, Congress must have created the law through a valid exercise of
its powers pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985) (holding that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it speaks with the
requisite clarity).
17. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (holding that Congress had the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity because "the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the
ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between
state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment").
18. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
19. See id. at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction."); see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246
(1999) (recognizing and reaffirming Seminole Tribe's holding).
20. See id at 59 (observing that "through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal
power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore that [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the
immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment").
21. See id. at 71 n.14 (citing United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892)).
More recently, the Court, after ruling that a state's sovereign immunity shielded it
from suit brought by state probation officers for violation of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act's ("FLSA") overtime provisions, observed that federal prosecution of
the same state violation would have been both permissible and appropriate. See Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2269 (dictum).
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viduals to bring suits against state officers to ensure their compliance
with federal law,2 or the right of the Court to review a question of
federal law arising from a state court decision where a state has consented to suit.' On a more abstract level, the Seminole Tribe court
emphasized the link between sovereign immunity and federalism concerns by intimating that national concerns and state concerns should
be rigidly partitioned, and that the federal government should not infringe upon states' sovereignty. 4 The Court's jurisprudence on the
Eleventh Amendment closely parallels its jurisprudence on federalism
and its belief in the devolution of the federal government. 2
Because states can be sued in federal court only when the plaintiff is
the United States or another state, to answer the question of whether
a state can be sued under the FCA, courts must first determine the
identity of the plaintiff in such actions.26 Because most courts find
that it is the United States who is "the real party in interest,"27 they
conclude that states cannot invoke their sovereign immunity to dismiss these claims, even when the plaintiff prosecuting the action remains the individual whistleblower. 8 In response to this practice, this
Note argues that "real party in interest" is little more than a term of
art that refers to procedural practice. 29 In designating the United
States as the real party in interest, most courts ignore the fact that qui
tam relators are also real parties in interest in FCA suits." Thus, identifying the "real party in interest" does not further the inquiry into
whether a state may invoke its sovereign immunity.31 State sovereign
immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal courts regardless
of whether the United States is a real party in interest. 32 A better approach would be to allow FCA suits brought against a state to proceed
where the United States has intervened, and to dismiss those suits in
22. See 517 U.S. at 711 n.14 (citing ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

23. See id. (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 6 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)).
24. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. See also Linda Greenhouse, High

Court Faces Moment of Truth in Federalism Cases,N.Y. Times, Mar. 28,1999, at 34.
26. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
27. In United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.
1999), the Fifth Circuit drew a distinction between "the real party in interest" and "a

real party in interest." Id. at 289 n.16 (emphasis added). The difference between using the definite, rather than the indefinite, article is relevant to solving the principal

question that this Note poses-when can a state defending an FCA suit assert its sovereign immunity?
28. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra notes 263-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
There exists some dispute as to whether this constitutional limitation acts as a

jurisdictional bar or the limitation is more akin to an affirmative defense that the state
can assert at any stage of the litigation. See generally United States ex rel. Long v. SCS
Bus. & Tech. Inst., Nos. 98-5133, 98-5148 & 98-5150, 1999 WL 252644, at *1 to *2

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1999), (discussing the different interpretations of how to classify
the sovereign immunity defense).
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which it has not.33 Doing so also acknowledges and reinforces the
principles of federalism underlying the Court's recent Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.-"
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of qui tam actions and of
the FCA. This part also considers the procedures governing the
prosecution of FCA actions. Part II discusses the Eleventh Amendment, beginning with an analysis of Article ImI of the Constitution and
its interpretation in Chisholm v. Georgia, and of the Eleventh
Amendment, which was ratified in response to the Chisholm decision.
This part then explains the Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana and
its importance in the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The Court's current position with respect to the Eleventh
Amendment, as stated in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,is then presented.
Part IlI describes the "real party in interest" doctrine and explains its
role in courts' analysis of whether states may invoke their sovereign
immunity to escape lawsuits based on the FCA. Part IV explains why
a real party in interest analysis is incorrect in this context, and argues
that courts should instead focus on the party possessing primary responsibility to prosecute an FCA action in determining whether a
state can invoke immunity.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This part discusses the legal evolution of qui tam actions from their
inception in England to their importation to the New World and subsequent incorporation into the FCA. It then describes in detail the
circumstances surrounding the FCA's passage and the amendments
that followed. This part concludes with a brief discussion of procedure under the FCA.
A. The Origin of Qui Tam Statutes
1. Qui Tam Statutes in England
The qui tam action first developed in England in the thirteenth century as a means for private parties to gain access to the king's court,
because that court considered disputes involving the king only. s
Lawyers considered the king's court to be superior to local courts,
which usually had jurisdiction over disputes between private parties,
because of the local courts' poor reputation for competency and fairness.36 There existed two types of common law qui tam proceedings:
the first type was brought by individuals suing for a redress of their
33. See infra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
35. See History and Development, supra note 4, at 83-84.

36. See id at 85.
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grievances, and the second type was brought by individuals, known as
common informers, who sued for part of a statutory penalty and were
considered bounty hunters. 7 Eventually, the king's court expanded
its jurisdiction to include disputes between private parties, and the
In addition, the
common law qui tam action fell into disuse.
by
qui
tam
relators
resulted
in a distrust
overzealous pursuit of bounty
39
of common law informers.
As the common law qui tam action declined in importance, statutory qui tam actions became more prevalent. 40 The attractiveness of
qui tam statutes in fourteenth century England resulted, in large part,
from the absence of an organized and established police force. 41 Thus,
in lieu of formal governmental authority that enforced the law, parliament established a series of qui tam statutes to enforce the penal
law. 42 The relator could bring suit in either a civil or a criminal proceeding; 43 the choice of proceeding determined the manner in which
the court conducted the suit. 44 The qui tam relator's authority even
allowed him to bring indictments against defendants, although parliament 4eventually
limited the relators' criminal prosecutions to informa5
tions.
Despite the utility of qui tam actions, Parliament also took steps to
rein in the power of qui tam relators in order to curb abuse of relators'
power. To prevent the collusive use of qui tam suits allowing a
wrongdoer to escape the effect of a penalty,46 Parliament eliminated
the preclusive effect of collusive suits in instances where the relator
misbehaved. 47 Parliament later passed a statute that fined qui tam relators who brought suit for purposes of harassment, and allowed prevailing defendants to recover attorneys' fees and court costs.48

37. See id. at 84-85.
38. See id. at 85.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 85-86.
41. See id. at 86. Although statutory qui tam provisions existed as early as the
fourteenth century, they did not become prevalent until the sixteenth century. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 88.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 87-88. Qui tam relators were permitted to bring informations on behalf of the British government until 1950. See Robert W. Fischer, Jr., Comment, Qui
Tam Actions: The Role of the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 778, 779 & n.8 (1973).
46. In such cases, the relator, a friend of the wrongdoer, would agree to prosecute
a qui tam action and either settle the case for a minimal fine or allow the wrongdoer
to prevail at a feigned trial. See History and Development, supra note 4, at 89. For
similar purposes, during the Tudor period, relators in qui tam actions were prevented
from discontinuing actions without permission from the court. See United States v.
Griswold, 24 F. 361, 364 (D. Or. 1885).
47. See History and Development, supra note 4, at 89 & n.48.

48. See id. at 90.
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2.

Qui Tam Statutes in the United States

Most of the British North American colonies adopted the bulk of
existing English statutory law through legislative fiat 9 Although
statutory qui tam laws were thus adopted wholesale, it is unclear to
what extent the colonies adopted English common law!"a There appears to be no evidence, however, that a common law qui tam suit was
ever filed in colonial North America."
The historical record demonstrates that the colonists were aware of
the utility of qui tam suits.5s For example, at least ten of the first fourteen statutes enacted by the United States Congress relied upon qui
tam provisions for enforcementOss Colonies, and later states, enacted
qui tam provisions to help enforce the law.- Most courts at this time
recognized that qui tam provisions represented the joinder of public
and private interests. 55 As in England, qui tam provisions were popular because an effective police force was non-existent.51
American legislatures, like Parliament, passed numerous laws to
curb the power of qui tam relators who initiated lawsuits intended to
harass, or to collude with, the defendant. In some instances of abuse,
relators were required to pay the prevailing defendant's costs; other
times courts levied penalties.5 The enactment of short statutes of
limitations for qui tam actions and stricter venue statutes also helped
control abuses by relators. 8 In addition, some states made criminal
prosecution the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, vesting in the government the decision whether to prosecute. Other jurisdictions simply
revoked the relator's share of the penalty in civil and criminal actions,
thus removing any incentive to prosecute an action qui tam.59
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the popularity of qui tam
provisions waned on both federal and state levels.w This was due in
part to the development of other means to enforce laws. For instance,
49. See id at 91.
50. See id. at 93; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-37 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the adoption of common law doctrines in the
United States).
51. Boese, supra note 7, at 1-8.

52. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) ("Statutes providing for actions
by a common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy
other than that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in ...
this country ever since the foundation of our Government.").
53. See United States ex reL Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F.
Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constittionalityof

Qui Tam Actions, 99 Yale LJ. 341,342 & n.3 (1989).
54. See History and Development,supra note 4, at 94-95.
55. Seeid. at95.
56. See Fischer, supra note 45, 778-79.
57. See History and Development,supra note 4, at 97.
58. See id. at 97.
59. See id. at 97-98.
60. See id at 99-100.
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Congress created the DOJ in 1870, which enabled the Attorney General to enforce the laws more effectively.6 The creation of governmental bodies to enforce the law not only eliminated the need for qui
tam actions in general, but also provided a more neutral enforcer of
the law. Although the use of qui tam actions waned and almost became forgotten, Congress incorporated the underlying doctrines and
principals behind such actions into the FCA, as will be discussed in
part II.
B.

The False Claims Act

1. History of the False Claims Act
Congress enacted the FCA in response to rampant fraud that was
perpetrated upon the United States military by government contractors during the Civil War.62 Qui tam actions were at that time a familiar part of American law. 63 Prior to the creation of the DOJ, the
Attorney General's office and its staff lacked the resources to enforce
laws that required extensive investigation.' Therefore, one of Congress's motivations in creating a qui tam action under the FCA was to
stymie fraud against the government more effectively, or as one of the
statute's supporters stated, the Act encourages "a rogue to catch a
rogue."'65 Additionally, many public officials were thought to be intimately involved in the corrupt practices of Civil War defense contractors, and Congress feared that public law enforcement officers might
therefore hesitate to prosecute offenses diligently. 6
The FCA, 67 also known as the "Informer's Act" or "Lincoln Law," r
authorized the recovery of double the amount of damages sustained
by the United States in addition to a $2000 fine for each false claim by
a contractor. 69 The qui tam provision allotted half of any amount re-

61. See Boese, supra note 7, at 1-6.
62- See United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 (11th
Cir. 1991). Since then, there were two major revisions of the statute; one occurred in
1943, and the other in 1986. See generally James B. Helmer, Jr., et al., False Claims
Act: Whistleblower Litigation 27-34 (1994) (describing the original statute, its subsequent statutory history, and the 1943 and 1986 amendments). For a more detailed
description of the 1943 and 1986 amendments, see infra notes 85-87, 90-100 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
64. See Boese, supra note 7, at 1-6; see also Helmer, et al., supra note 62, at 27
("Few tools existed to combat fraud and profiteering in 1863.").
65. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard).
66. See Note, Qui Tam Suits Under the FederalFalse Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 446,453 n.32 (1972).
67. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
68. See United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
69. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, § 3, 12 Stat. at 698.
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covered to the relator 0 It also assessed criminal and civil penalties
against the violator.7 ' Although the legislative history of the Act focused specifically on military contractor fraud, the Act was applicable
to fraud committed by government contractors generally n Unlike the
modem-day FCA, the 1863 Act required the relator to bear the cost
of pursuing his suit,73 and permitted the government to assume complete control "over the suit entirely at any time, at its sole discre'
tion."74

There were few civil False Claims Act decisions prior to 1930.
This was due in part to the end of the Civil War, which created the
opportunities for defrauding the government that the Informer's Act
was meant to remedy 6 The most significant FCA decision after the
Civil War and prior to the Great Depression was United States v.
Griswold.7 In Griswold, the court held that although the Government could release a qui tam defendant from damages owed under the
Act, it could not release the defendant from damages owed to the informer. 8
Unlike the modern version of the FCA, the Informer's Act lacked a
provision limiting relators to recovery on actions brought alleging
fraud that was previously unknown to the government. 9 Without
such a limiting provision, a number of "parasitic" suits were brought
using information in the criminal indictment to initiate civil qui tam
suits." With the expansion of the federal government and the increased use of government contractors subsequent to the enactment
of New Deal legislation, this failing became more apparent.8 ' The Supreme Court, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, ' considered
whether the Informer's Act allowed such "parasitic" actions and concluded that it did not prevent them.83
In response to the Court's decision in Marcus, Congress amended
70. See id-at § 6, 12 Stat. at 698.
71. See id. at § 3, 12 Stat. at 698. Congress eventually divided the Act into two
separate provisions, one involving the criminal prosecution of tendering false statements, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), and the other involving civil prosecution of
the submission of false claims, codified in 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (1994). See Helmer,
et al., supra note 62, § 3-4, at 27-28.
72- See Act of Mar. 2,1863, §§ 1, 3 & 6,12 Stat. at 697,698.
73. Seeid § 6,12Stat. at 698.
74. Boese, supranote 7, at 1-11.
75. See United States ex reL LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp.
1351,1354 (D. Mass 1988).
76. See Boese, supra note 7, at 1-12.
77. 24 F. 361 (D. Or. 1885).
78. See id. at 367.
79. Compare Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 with 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730
(1994).
80. See LaValley, 707 F. Supp. at 1354.
81. See Boese, supra note 7, at 1-12.
82. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
83. See id. at 546.
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the Informer's Act to provide that the government's prior knowledge
of the allegations in a qui tam complaint acted as an absolute bar
against FCA suits based on the same facts, even if the relator was the
original source of the information." Instead, to make out a valid
complaint the relator had to contribute new information previously
unknown to the government.8
This constituted the first major
amendment to the 1863 FCA statute.
The statute, as amended in 1943, also allowed the DOJ to intervene
and take over the prosecution of a FCA case. 86 To decrease the incentive to cheat the government, Congress reduced the bounty available
to relators to a maximum of 25% in cases where the government did
not intervene and a maximum of 10% where the government did intervene." Although the 1943 amendments made the prospect of suing
qui tam less attractive, there existed a strong correlation between the
frequency of FCA actions and times of war. 8 Additionally, with the
increase in the number of government assistance programs after
World War II, the government began to use the FCA against persons
and corporations other than government contractors. 89
In 1986, faced with an increasing federal budget deficit and reports
from the media of $100 screwdrivers and $600 toilet seats, 90 Congress
amended the FCA once more to facilitate the prosecution of FCA actions. 91 Congress revised the penalty provisions of the FCA by increasing the civil penalty from $2000 to up to $10,000, and by increasing the damages due to the government from two times the amount of
the fraud perpetrated to three times the amount of money defrauded.' As an incentive to increase the number of FCA suits initiated, the relator's share of the recovery also increased to a minimum
of 15% if the government intervenes and 25% if the government declines to intervene.93
The 1986 amendments also gave the government more control over
qui tam lawsuits than it previously had under the 1863 statute as
84. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, 609.
85. See 57 Stat. at 609.
86. See 57 Stat. at 608.
87. See 57 Stat. at 609.
88. See Boese, supra note 7, at 1-14. This correlation makes sense since the government's contracting activities increase dramatically during times of war.
89. See id. at 1-14.
90. See 132 Cong. Rec. 56077 (1986) (remarks of Sen. McClure); see also Helmer
et al., supra note 62, § 3-6, at 33-34 (citing 131 Cong. Rec. 17818 (1985)) (remarks of
Rep. Weiss) (describing contractor abuses such as billing the government $400 for
hammers and $7000 for coffeepots).
91. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266,
5267.
92. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994); see also S.
Rep. No. 99-345, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266, 5282.
93. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266,
5292.
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amended in 1943. For instance, under the 1986 amendments, the government can decline to intervene in the suit initially and then petition
the court to intervene at a later date upon a showing of "good
cause."' Furthermore, the government is able to keep a closer watch
over the qui tam relator, even when it elects not to intervene, by requiring that95 the relator forward copies of all pleadings and deposition
transcripts.

The 1986 amendments also provided greater protection of the relator's interest in the action, and permitted greater participation by the
relator in the FCA action. 6 Although the government has the power
to settle a case notwithstanding the relator's objections, the relator has
an opportunity, in a hearing before the court, to enjoin the government from settling.97 In addition, even though both the government
and the defendant can petition the court to restrict the relator's role in
the false claims prosecution, such a petition will be successful only if
the petitioner can prove that the relator's actions are duplicative, harassing, or vexatious. 98

Finally, the 1986 amendments appended a

clause concerning the wrongful termination of employees who file a
complaint as a qui tam plaintiff.99 Such a qui tam relator's relief includes "reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee
would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back
pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees."" °
2. Procedure Under the False Claims Act
After the qui tam relator fries a sealed complaint in federal court,
the government has sixty days to investigate the complaint and to re94. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1994); see S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 26-27 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266, 5291-92. "Good cause" is a very easy standard to satisfy;
courts have often permitted the government to intervene after the initial investigative
period if the government can demonstrate that newly discovered evidence has forced
it to re-evaluate the wisdom of declining intervention earlier and that its intervention
would not prejudice the defendant. See Boese, supra note 7, at 4-107.
95. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
96. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266,
5290.
97. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
98. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(C) & (D).
99. See id. § 3730(h). This section of the statute has its own Eleventh Amendment
problems. In cases where a relator alleges that she has been wrongfully terminated by
a state agency because of her role as a qui tant relator, courts have routinely dismissed
the claim on the ground of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins
v. Ohio, No. 97-3216, 1998 WL 279375, at *3 (6th Cir. May 20, 1998) (per curiam) (affirming district court's holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars compensatory relief sought by the plaintiff under § 3730(h)), afg 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995);
United States ex reL Moore v. University of Mich., 860 F. Supp. 400, 404-05 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (holding that the statute did not abrogate state sovereign immunity).
100. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
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view the supporting evidence and materials.' Within this period of
time, the government may elect to "intervene and proceed with the
action."'" If the government does intervene, it has "the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an
act of the [relator]."' 1 3 Alternatively, if the government elects not to
intervene, "the person who initiated the action shall have the right to
conduct the action." 104
If the government elects not to intervene, it has no role in the conduct of the litigation other than its right to request service of copies of
all deposition transcripts and pleadings filed in the action.105 The government may also petition the court to stay discovery upon demonstration that the relator "would interfere with the Government's investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil matter arising out of
the same facts."'1 6 This right to stay discovery exists regardless of
whether the government elects to intervene, 1°7 and is in accord with
the FCA's purpose of remedying fraud against the government. 08s
Nevertheless, the government may still intervene at a later time if it
can demonstrate "good cause."'"
If the government elects to intervene in the action, it has "primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action, and [is not] bound by an act
of the person bringing the action."" 0 The relator, however, may continue to participate in the litigation subject to certain enumerated
conditions."' Upon petition by the government, the court may restrict
the participation of the relator if it can be shown that the relator's unrestricted participation would "interfere with or unduly delay the
101. See id. § 3730(b)(2).
102. Id. With the court's permission, the government may postpone its decision on
whether to intervene to allow additional time for investigation. See id. § 3730(b)(3).
103. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
104. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
105. See id. Some courts have interpreted this limitation to exclude participation
by the United States in settlement negotiations. See infra note 306 and accompanying
text; see generally Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and

Roles of the Government and the Relator under the False Claims Act, 82 Minn. L. Rev.
1357, 1360 (1998) (discussing the current circuit split on whether the United States has
absolute power to block qui tam settlements).

106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4). Although the statute allows the government this right,
there have been no reported cases to date interpreting or applying this section. See
Boese, supra note 7, at 4-112.1.

107. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(4).
108. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266,
5266-68.
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3); see Boese, supra note 7, at 4-107 to 4-108 and notes
therein.
110. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1); see also id. § 3730(c)(2) (setting forth various conditions for the relator's conditioned participation). The default rule is that the relator is
permitted to continue her involvement in the case unless it either unduly interferes

with the government's prosecution of the case or unduly harasses the defendant. See
id. § 3730(c)(2)(C) & (D).
111. See id. § 3730(c)(2).
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Government's prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment." ' The defendant may move the
court for similar relief, which will be granted if it can be demonstrated
that the relator's actions are "for purposes of harassment or would
cause the defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense."113 These
limitations on the relator's actions reflect the historic hostility toward
relators who were often perceived as 14
acting solely in their own interest
or with malice toward the defendant.
Although the government has the option to intervene either after
the filing of the complaint or later upon a demonstration of "good
cause," and although an FCA action is brought in part for the benefit
of the United States," 5 the relator does not surrender all of his interest
in the action once the government intervenes. If the government, after intervening, elects to dismiss the case despite the relator's objection, the government must inform the relator of the motion to dismiss,
and the court must provide the relator with a hearing on that motion." 6 If the government desires to settle the case despite the relator's objection, the court must first hold a hearing to review the settlement for its fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness under all the
circumstances." 7
When the government proceeds with an action brought initially by
the relator, the relator is entitled to receive at least 15%, but no more
than 25%, of any amount recovered.' It is within the court's discretion to determine where in this range the award should be granted, although it may consider any contributions to the litigation made by the
relator." 9 Prevailing relators also receive reasonable attorneys' fees
from the defendant.' m If the government does not proceed with an action brought by the relator, and if the relator is ultimately successful in
recovering money from the defendant, the relator, at the discretion of
the court, is entitled to receive between 25% to 30% of the recovery
plus reasonable attorneys' fees."
When a relator brings an FCA action against a state, the procedure
is no different than when the defendant is a corporation or an individual. States, however, often assert a defense of sovereign immunity in
order to dismiss the suit. Part II will discuss the constitutional roots of
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and will
outline relevant Supreme Court cases that have developed the con112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
11&
119.
120.
121.

Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
Id. § 3730(c)(2)(D).
See supra notes 46-48,57-59 and accompanying text.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
See id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
See id. § 3730(d)(1).
See id.
See id.
See id. § 3730(d)(2).
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cept of sovereign immunity in FCA actions.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Constitution, as subsequently amended by the Eleventh
Amendment, serves as the starting point for any analysis of sovereign
immunity. This part analyzes the original constitutional language creating the federal judiciary and defining its jurisdiction, together with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of it. It then analyzes the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
and how that interpretation forecloses virtually all suits brought by
individuals against states.
Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution defines the
limits of the federal courts' jurisdiction.12' Among other jurisdictional
delineations, it states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend.., ' to
Controversies... between a State and Citizens of another State."'
The available historical evidence does not reveal definitively what the
drafters of the Constitution meant by this grant of authority. At various state constitutional conventions, certain ratifiers of the Constitution expressed their concern about the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction over states. A literal reading of the Constitutional language
suggests that the federal courts were given original jurisdiction in all
cases in which a state and the citizen of another state are adversaries.
By a vote of four to one, this was also the Supreme Court's interpretation of the clause in Chisholm v. Georgia. a
A. Chisholm v. Georgia
The background of Chisholm v. Georgia involved Robert Farquhar,
a South Carolina citizen who supplied materials to Georgia during the
Revolutionary War."2 Alexander Chisholm, a South Carolina citizen
and the executor of Farquhar's estate, brought an action of assumpsit
against Georgia to recover money owed to the estate.16 Under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction
over suits against a state by citizens of other states.127 Edmund
Randolph, who was also serving at that time as Attorney General,
represented Chisholm before the Court.'2 Randolph argued that the
controversy was one that could be litigated in federal court because
122. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1 (amended 1798); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 760-61, 819 (1824).
123. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.
1 (amended 1798).
124. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,449,452, 466-67,479 (1793).
125. See John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh
Amendment in American History 12 (1987).
126. See id.
127. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
128. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
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the Constitution specifically granted the Court original jurisdiction

over controversies between a state and a citizen of another state.'2
Although both the governor and attorney general of Georgia received
notice of the lawsuit before the Supreme Court, neither appeared before the Court because Georgia refused to acknowledge that the
Court had power over it unless it consented to be sued.'-'
In a four-to-one decision, the Court ruled in favor of Chisholm and
concluded that the text of the Constitution authorized suits against a
state by citizens of another state.13 ' The Court justified this holding

through a literal interpretation of Article Il, Section 2 of the Constitution. Dissenting alone, Justice Iredell reviewed the Judiciary Act of
17891' and concluded that it neither specifically nor implicitly
authorized suits in assumpsit against the states.133 Because the legisla-

tive grant of authority to the courts did not resolve the issue, Justice
Iredell looked next to English common law"M and concluded that such
suits were not permitted against the government under common law
unless the government consented to suit. 35 Consequently, and notwithstanding the language of Article I, which he deemed inconclusive, Justice Iredell believed the Court should not have the authority
to hear a suit brought by a citizen against a state1 36
The states were outraged by the Court's decision.13 For example,
the lower house of the Georgia legislature adopted a resolution de129. See hi. at 420.
130. See Orth,supra note 125, at 13.
131. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449,452,466-67,479.
132. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear various types of
cases).
133. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433-34,436-47 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
whole business of organizing the Courts, and directing the methods of their proceeding where necessary [is] in the discretion of Congress."). In reaching this conclusion,
Iredell considered Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, which, in turn, "referred [the
Court] to principles and usages of law already well known." Id. at 434. Section 14 of

the Judiciary Act stated that federal courts had the "power to issue writs of scire fa-

cias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to
the principles and usages of law." Section 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
134. See Chishom, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[C]onsequently
we have no other rule to govern us but the principles of the ... common law."). For
Justice Iredell's analysis of sovereign immunity in English common law, see id. at 43745.
135. See id. at 445-46.
136. See id. at 449.
137. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (stating that the Chisholm decision created "a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of

Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost

unanimously proposed."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.2, at 373-74
(2d ed. 1994); Clyde E. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
55 (1972). But see James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's OriginalJurisdictionin State-Party Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 578-88 (1994) (arguing that the states'
reaction to Chishon was more complex).
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claring that anyone attempting to enforce the Supreme Court's decision is "hereby declared to be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death,
without the benefit of the clergy, by being hanged." 138 Within three
weeks of the entry of judgment, both houses of Congress proposed
resolutions to amend the Constitution that would overturn the Court's
decision in Chisholm.1 9 Of the fifteen states then in the Union,
twelve ratified the Eleventh Amendment within one year of the
Chisholm decision.1'0
The text of the Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign
State."'' A literal reading of the text of the amendment appears to
eliminate only the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction over cases in
which citizen-state diversity exists.'4 2 Furthermore, a literal reading
would suggest that federal courts retained jurisdiction over cases, "in
law and equity, arising under this Constitution, [or] the Laws of the
United States."'43 The scope of the Eleventh Amendment, however,
was not construed so narrowly; in 1890, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana144 expanded the scope of sovereign immunity to shield states from
suits by its own citizens
that were based upon the court's federal ques145
tion jurisdiction.

138. Jacobs, supra note 137, at 56-57 (quoting The Augusta Chronicle, Nov. 23,
1793) (reporting the actions of the Georgia legislature of November 19).
139. See Chemerinsky, supra note 137, § 7.2, at 374.

140. See Jacobs, supra note 137, at 66-67. Some historians have attributed the
states' underlying motivation in preserving their sovereign immunity to fear of a vast
wave of similar suits brought by their creditors for debts incurred during the Revolu-

tion. See Orth, supra note 125, at 7-8. But see Jacobs, supra note 137, at 70 ("[Tlhere is
practically no evidence that Congress proposed and the legislatures ratified the Elev-

enth Amendment to permit the states to escape payment of existing obligations.").
These scholars note that there was concern among the states that British creditors and
American Tories whose property was seized during the war would sue the states to
recover their assets. See Orth, supra note 125, at 7.
141. U.S. Const. amend. XI.

142. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XI (stating that judicial power of the federal
government does not extend to "any suit... commenced or prosecuted against one of

the United States by Citizens... of [another] State"), with U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.
1 (amended 1798) (stating that the federal judiciary has the authority to hear controversies between "a State and Citizens of another State").
143. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (amended 1798). Although Congress did not create federal question jurisdiction for the courts until 1875, see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch.
137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (amended as codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), earlier
courts recognized the possibility of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the "arising under"
clause of Article III. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,

760-61 (1824).
144. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

145. See id. at 20 ("[T]he obligations of a State rest for their performance upon its

honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subjects of judicial cognizance unless
the State consents to be sued, or comes itself into court ....).
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Hans v. Louisiana

In Hans v. Louisiana, the plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, held
bonds issued in 1874 by authority of the Louisiana state legislature."*
The bonds had a forty-year maturity date, and bearers were entitled
to receive interest payments semi-annually. 147 In 1879, Louisiana
adopted a new constitution and repudiated all of its prior contract obligations, including the payment of bond coupons.14 Subsequently,
Hans sued Louisiana in federal court to recover the principal and interest owed. 49
In response, Louisiana invoked its sovereign immunity, arguing that
Hans's suit lacked state consent150 The circuit court sustained Louisi51
ana's assertion of its sovereign immunity and dismissed the suit.
Hans appealed the circuit court's decision, arguing that the Eleventh
Amendment should be interpreted literally to allow a state to invoke
its sovereign immunity only against the citizens and subjects of other
states, not its own citizens.'52 In addition, Hans argued that he should
thus be allowed to proceed with his suit because his cause of action
arose out of Louisiana's violation of his constitutional right to contract
freely." 3 Accordingly, Hans argued, this cause of action fell within the
court's federal question jurisdiction.'
Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, rejected Hans's contention
that the Court could exercise federal question jurisdiction over a nonconsenting state. 55 Instead, the court observed that if the Eleventh
Amendment were read literally, then an "anomalous result" would be
achieved in federal question cases: "a State may be sued in the federal
courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of
action by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state."m Permitting such suits would allow states to be sued in federal court even if
they refused to surrender sovereign immunity in their own courts.5 7
Instead of adopting the literalist approach, the Court adopted the
legal analysis in Justice Iredell's Chisholm dissent.15 It reasoned that
because Congress and the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment in
order to nullify the Court's decision in Chisholm, effectively adopting
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id at 1-2.
See iL
See id. at 2-3.
See 1i.at 1-2.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 9-10.

155. See id. at 18.
156. Id. at 10.
157. See Ud.
158. For an analysis of Justice Iredell's dissent see supra text accompanying notes
132-33.
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Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion, the Court should continue to follow Iredell's reasoning in this case.1 59 It is illogical, the Court argued,
to believe that Congress and the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment with the intention to allow citizens of a state to sue their own
state in federal courts, while "indignantly repell[ing]" similar suits by
citizens of other states, or of foreign states. 16° The Court was not only
able to point to Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, but also to other
opinions by the Court in support of the proposition that the ratifiers
never contemplated abrogation of sovereign immunity. 161 Furthermore, "cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law," Justice
Bradley wrote, "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States." 62 The Court,
however, acknowledged certain exceptions, such as the resolution of
boundary disputes between states, which were necessarily created as a
result of the Union's formation.163 Additionally, the Court marshaled
historical evidence from the writings and speeches of Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall in support of the
proposition that states retained their sovereign immunity after the
ratification of the Constitution, despite the apparent nullification of
sovereign immunity in Article III."6 Using the historical record, it attempted to demonstrate that Hans's legal arguments "strain[ed] the
Constitution
and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed
165
of."

For example, the Court noted that in Federalist Number 81, Alexander Hamilton stated that "'[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without [the
state's] consent.""' In the same essay, Hamilton wrote that "[t]he
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the
159. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12 ("[On this question of the suability of the States...

the highest authority of this country was in accord rather with the minority than with
the majority of the court [in Chisholm]; and this fact lends additional interest to the
able opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell .....

160. Id. at 15.
161. See id. at 16 ("The suability of a State, without its consent was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and
jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted.").

162. Id. at 15.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 12-15. For alternative views regarding the effect of the ratification of
the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment on state sovereign immunity, see generally, Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1473-92
(1987); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRatherthan a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1054-63 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1889, 1934-38 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1, 39-73 (1988).
165. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
166. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted) (quoting The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive
force."'167 During the Virginia state constitutional convention, James
Madison addressed the fears of the anti-Federalists concerning Virginia's legal liabilities by stating that "[ilt is not in the power of individuals to call any State into court."1' 6 Madison also interpreted Article m, Section 2, Clause 1 as only providing "a citizen a right to be
heard in the federal courts; and if a State should condescend
to be a
69
party, [the federal courts] may take cognizance of it."'
The Court also analyzed the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, which
granted federal courts jurisdiction over federal question issues.t 70 It
observed that the language of the statute suggested that Congress "did
not intend to invest its courts with any new and strange jurisdictions."' 7' Furthermore, the Court reasoned, because state courts did
not have power to entertain suits by individuals against a state without
its consent, it would be incongruous that the federal circuit court,
which had only concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts, could acquire the power to entertain such suits."r
Although not expressly stated, the Court's holding in Hans constitutionalized the principle of sovereign immunity, as has been recognized
in subsequent cases.173 Hans remains the touchstone that all subsequent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence must consider and interpret. 7 4 Although Hans faced relentless attacks by legal academia
through the 1980s, 171 the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida
recognized the vitality of the underlying doctrine stated in Hans: the
judicial power of the federal courts does not extend to suits brought
by individuals directly against a state, regardless of the individual's
citizenship, unless the state first consents to the action. 76
167. ld. (quoting The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
168. Id. at 14.

169. Id.
170. See Act of Mar. 3,1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
171. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.
172- See id. at 18.
173. See e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) (stating that decisions "since Hans had been equally clear that the Eleventh Amendment reflects 'the
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. I"' (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984))); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("Manifestly,
we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article HI, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits

against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control.").
174. See, eg., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Tribe Decision and State Sovereign
Immunity, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 7-13 (1996) (discussing various theories regarding the
significance and meaning of Hans in connection with interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment).
175. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 164, at 1038-45; Gibbons, supra note 164, at
1893-94.
176. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
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Seminole Tribe v. Florida

Seminole Tribe v. Florida" explicitly overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.18 with respect to the question of whether the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against non-consenting states in areas of law where the Constitution vests Congress with complete law-making authority. 7 9 The
Court considered for the first time whether Congress had the power to
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity outside the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 0 The Union Gas court concluded that Congress
did have the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity so long as
it acted pursuant to the powers granted to it either under Article I of
the Constitution or under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 '
In Union Gas, the Court considered whether Congress, in enacting
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act'82 ("CERCLA") as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") 13 , clearly expressed an intent to hold states liable for any damage resulting from,
the conduct described in the statute.'
After concluding that it did,",
the Court considered whether Congress could create a cause of action
for monetary damages against the states when legislating pursuant to
the Commerce Clause."8 The Court concluded that Congress could
do so, but Justice Brennan could only muster a plurality of Justices to
agree with his reasoning." In reaching its conclusion, the Brennan
plurality reasoned that the Commerce Clause, like the Fourteenth
Amendment, "expand[ed] federal power and contract[ed] state
power."1 8 Furthermore, the plurality reasoned that the power
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause would be incomplete
unless Congress also retained the authority to abrogate Eleventh

177. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
178. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
179. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
180. See Meltzer, supra note 174, at 28.
181. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 16, 23. Article I of the Constitution enumerates
the powers of Congress, such as the power to pass laws protecting patent and trademarks, laws protecting interstate commerce, and laws regulating Native Americans.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress
the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
182. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. H 1996)).
183. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
184. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
185. See id. at 13.
186. See id. at 5.
187. The plurality consisted of Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun.
188. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 17; cf Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976) (holding that Congress had the authority to nullify state sovereign immunity
when it acted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Amendment immunity.189 Justice White provided the fifth vote in a

separate opinion, in which he reached the same conclusion as the plurality, although disagreeing with the plurality's reasoning.9
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, argued that Congress did not have the
Constitutional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.19 1
State sovereign immunity, according to the dissent, was "a fundamental principle of federalism, evidenced by the Eleventh Amendment."' 2 To uphold abrogation of sovereign immunity through the
Commerce Clause, or another Article I power, however, would violate the rationale of Hans and eviscerate the principle of immunity
which it conferred. 93
The Court's holding in Seminole Tribe v. Florida9' represents the
triumph of the Union Gas dissenters. In Seminole Tribe, the Court

considered whether Congress, under authority of the Indian Commerce Act, 95 had the power to allow a Native American tribe to bring
suit in federal court against a state to compel performance under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.191 The Court, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress exceeded its authority
in attempting to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity through use
189. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15-17.
190. See iL at 45 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. See id at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. Id at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion with the plurality, Justice Stevens observes that the Eleventh Amendment, as construed by the Court,
really contains two distinct applications that others often confuse. See id. at 23-24
(Stevens, J., concurring). The first application, a literal interpretation of the plain
language of the Eleventh Amendment, bars only the prosecution of citizen-state and
alien-state suits. See id. The second application, developed by the Court in Hans v.
Louisiana is "based on a prudential interest in federal-state comity and a concern for
'Our Federalism."' Id at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, Stevens argues that the
central question in any Eleventh Amendment case should be whether the judiciary
has the "power to entertain the suit." Id If it does not, no act of Congress, regardless
of its intention, can give the judiciary this power. See id. Yet when the Court has
dealt with the Eleventh Amendment in the past, it considered state sovereign immunity on grounds other than judicial power. See id at 25-26. Justice Stevens argues that
the only way to make sense of the Court's refusal to assert its power on these occasions is to treat the issue of immunity as a question of what the proper role of the federal courts in the "amalgam of federal-state relations." Id at 25. Thus, rather than
trammel needlessly upon the delicate balance between federal and state power, Justice Stevens explains that the Court requires that Congress evince a clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See id
193. See id. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that if the Commerce Clause could
be used to circumvent the restriction of jurisdiction posited in Article I, as amended
by the Eleventh Amendment, then Article II "would be transformed from a comprehensive description of the permissible scope of federal judicial authority to a mere default disposition").
194. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
195. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
196. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L No. 100-497, § 11, 102 Stat. 2472
(1988) (amended and codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994)); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
47.
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of its Article I powers."9 This holding "reconfirm[ed] that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment," serves as a limitation on the judicial power under
Article
III that cannot be circumvented by Congress's Article I pow198
ers.
In concluding that Congress had unconstitutionally abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity, the Court first considered whether Congress had "unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity," 19 9 and then whether Congress had acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power. '"2' After reviewing the statute, the Court stated that
Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit." ' Observing that the authority to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment had previously been recognized in only two
provisions of the Constitution 2°--Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause-the Court considered whether the Indian Commerce Clause was sufficiently similar to
the Interstate Commerce Clause to justify application of Union Gas's
holding. Although the Court could find "no principled distinction"
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce
Clause,2 3 it nevertheless overruled Union Gas.1 4
The majority reversed Union Gas by arguing that the weight of stare
decisis from Hans v. Louisiana0 5 and Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Haldennan2 6 compelled it to reaffirm the Court's established federalism jurisprudence. 2°7 The Court reasoned that state sovereign immunity had been an "essential part of the Eleventh Amendment" for over a century,201and that "the Eleventh Amendment stood
for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited
the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III. ' ' 2° Citing to precedent, the Court established that the Eleventh Amendment "does not
exist solely in order to 'preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be

197. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
198. Id. at 72. For a more detailed discussion of the "background principle," see
infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
199. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (alteration in original) (quoting Green, 474 U.S.

at 68.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
Id. at 57.
See id. at 59-60.
Id. at 63.

204. See id. at 66.
205. 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1889) (holding that sovereign immunity, affirmed by the Elev-

enth Amendment, shielded states from suits by even its own citizens).
206. 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment reflects "the

fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III").
207. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63, 66.

208. Id. at 67.
209. Id. at 64.
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paid out of a State's treasury,"' 210 but also served "to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at
the instance of private parties.' 211 The Court's desire to avoid effrontery to the states conforms to its established Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.212
The Court also observed that the confusion that Union Gas had
promoted in the lower courts, along with the fact that the Union Gas
rationale was based on only a plurality of the Court, had rendered the
decision vulnerable to reversal.2 13 Citing the dissent in Union Gas, the
Court stated that the expansion of the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction through Congress's use of its Article I powers "'contradict[ed] [the Court's] unvarying approach to Article III as setting
forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdic214
tion."'
Finally, the Court rejected the Union Gas plurality's reliance on
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as an analogous provision to
justify congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity 1 5 The
majority distinguished Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment from
the Interstate Commerce Clause chronologically because the Fourteenth Amendment was "adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and.., operated to alter the pre-existing balance
between state and federal power achieved by Article IU and the Eleventh Amendment. ' 21 6 Although this chronological argument is criticized by the plurality in Union Gas,21 7 it does conform to the Court's
dicta concerning the relation between the deference due to states and
the states' sovereign immunity.2"'
By raising a defense of sovereign immunity, a state asserts its right

210. Id. at 58 (alteration in original) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson

Corp., 513 U.S. 30,48 (1994)).
211. Id. at 58 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)); see also Hess, 513 U.S. at 39 (stating that the twin goals
of the Eleventh Amendment were to shield states from forced payment of war debts
from the American Revolution and to sustain the "integrity retained by each State in
our federal system").
212- See, eg., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)
("'[Cjonstitutionally mandated balance of power' between the States and the Federal
Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties'.... By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of the States against suit in
federal court, the Eleventh Amendment serves to maintain this balance." (citations
omitted); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding the GunFree School Zones Act to be an unconstitutional infringement on the states' sovereign right to regulate police power).
213. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63.

214. Id. at 65 (alteration in original) (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491

U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
215. See id. at 65-66.
216. Id
217. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 17-18.
21& See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
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to be free of the heavy hand of federal control. Courts hearing FCA
claims brought against states recognize this, but have concluded that
because the United States is "the real party in interest" in these cases,
state sovereign immunity cannot be raised as a defense. Part III describes and explains the courts' "real party in interest" analysis in
FCA litigation.
III. "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST" ANALYSIS
This part examines the development and evolution of the real party
in interest doctrine. It then explains courts' application of the doctrine to FCA claims against states, which has resulted in the denial of
sovereign-immunity defenses. In formulating their reasoning behind
allowing suits against the states under the FCA to proceed, courts begin by positing that the United States is the real party in interest." 9
To support a finding that state sovereign immunity is no barrier to
prosecution when a state or state agency is the defendant in an FCA
action, courts borrow from the conclusions drawn in cases challenging
the qui tam relator's standing to sue.?20 In concluding that standing
does exist, these courts assume that the United States is a "real party
in interest."2 1 This, however, does not preclude the qui tam relator
from also being a "real party in interest." By concluding that the
United States is the only real party in interest, these courts miss the
more basic procedural purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a).
A. Development of the Real Party in Interest Requirement
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."'
Consequently, courts have held that the person who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the
right must bring the action. 3 The "real party in interest" doctrine
embodied in Rule 17(a) protects individuals from harassment and
multiple suits by persons who would not be bound by the principles of
219. The first reported decision to address whether the Eleventh Amendment's

provision of sovereign immunity to the states shields these states from FCA actions
was United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961
F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992). But see United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ.,

171 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) (diverging from this approach by instead inquiring
into who commenced or prosecuted the suit against the defendant).
220. See Milam, 961 F.2d at 49.
221. See id.
222. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
223. See 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1543, at

334 & n.1 (1990); see also id. § 1541, at 321 & n.7 (stating that under Rule 17(a), "the
action should be brought in the name of the party who possesses the substantive right
being asserted under the applicable law, whether that be state or federal" and providing case law in support of that proposition).

1999]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FCA

m
claim preclusion3
In Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg
Regional Hospital,"5 the court stated: "The purpose of [Rule 17(a)] is
to enable the defendant to present his defenses against the proper
persons, to avoid subsequent suits, and to proceed to finality of judgment."22 In addition, the requirement that plaintiffs bring an action
in the name of the real party in interest allows the defense to fully

avail itself of all discoverable evidence.m

The real party in interest doctrine developed as a way to circumvent
common law rules governing parties permitted to prosecute an action.
At common law, the assignee of a chose in action could not qualify as
the real party in interest because the assignee did not have legal title
to the action. s Thus, the assignee was forced to persuade the assignor to bring the suit.2 9 In courts of equity, this rule was more relaxed, although a person having an equitable or beneficial interest
who sued in equity would often name the owner of the legal title to
bind him to the decree3P The real party in interest doctrine developed as a means of eliminating the restrictive rule of the common law
courts.31 At the time of the adoption of the Field Code, from which
Rule 17(a) is derived,2-2 the purpose of the real party in interest rule
224. See Gogolin & Stelter v. Karn's Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F2d 100,102 (5th Cir.
1989); see also Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1541, at 322 & n.9. With the development of the doctrine of defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, it is easier to protect
individuals from multiple suits, but this protection is not complete. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,327-28 (1979).
225. 35 F.R.D. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
226. Id. at 517; see Honey v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 63 F.RD. 443, 447
(D.D.C. 1974); see also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485
F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that the purpose of Rule 17(a) "is to enable a defendant to present defenses he has against the real party in interest, to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to relief, and to ensure that the judgment will have proper res judicata effect").
227. See Celanese Corp. of Am. v. John Clark Indus., 214 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir.
1954).
228 See Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1541, at 320, § 1545, at 346.
229. See Michael C. Ferguson, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant's Interest in the Determination of ProperPartiesPlaintiff,55 Cal. L
Rev. 1452, 1453-54 (1967) ("Even though law courts recognized the concept of a real
party in interest, they insisted, for example, that all suits on a chose in action be commenced in the name of the legal owner of the chose." (footnote omitted)).
230. See Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1541, at 320.
231. See id. § 1545, at 346; see also John E. Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the
Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 Minn. L Rev. 675, 675-76 (1967) (suggesting
that the real purpose behind the adoption of the real party in interest rule was to facilitate the evasion of the common law rule, which prohibited a party from testifying;
by assigning her interest, the assignee became the "real party plaintiff," enabling the
assignor to testify as a nonparty). But see Ferguson, supra note 229, at 1452 (stating
that "[tihe real party in interest rule was originally designed to help courts determine
proper parties plaintiff in civil suits").
232- See Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1541, at 321 ("The original text of Rule
17(a) was taken almost verbatim from Equity Rule 37, which in turn was derived from
New York's Field Code of 1848 and similar state code provisions." (footnote omitted)).
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was "to help courts determine proper parties plaintiff in civil suits." 3
A party now may become a real party in interest through an assignment of interest.3 In such a case, the assignee is generally treated
as the real party in interest under Rule 17(a) and the assignor may no
longer sue.135 If there is a partial assignment in which both assignor
and assignee each retain an interest in the claim, both parties are real
parties in interest.z 6
The question of whether a party is a "real party in interest" is rarely
raised when considering whether a challenger to an act that violates
both public and private rights is the proper plaintiff to assert a
claim.z 7 Instead, courts apply the doctrine of standing to answer this
question.238 Standing is similar to the real party in interest rule in that
both terms describe a plaintiff who possesses a sufficient interest in
the action to have a case heard on its merits. However, once a court
recognizes that a party has standing to raise a constitutional point,
that ruling also disposes of whether the party is a real party in interest.239 Although distinctions between standing and real party in inter24
est analyses exist, some of which the courts occasionally confuse, 1
these differences are immaterial when analyzing the FCA.
B. Real Party in InterestAnalysis and the False Claims Act
When courts consider whether a state may invoke its sovereign immunity to dismiss a suit against it under the FCA, the preliminary issue to be resolved is determining whether the qui tam relator or the
government brings the suit. 4' If the suit is found to be a private action
brought by the relator, then most courts agree that a state may invoke
its sovereign immunity to dismiss the action.242 Alternatively, if the
suit is found to be a public action brought by the United States, a state
will be unable to invoke its sovereign immunity. 43 In answering this
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Ferguson, supra note 229, at 1452.
See Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1545, at 346.
See id. at 351.
See id. at 351,353.
See id. § 1542, at 329.

238. See id.
239. See Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 1975).
240. See Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1542, at 330.
241. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
162 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999); cf. Valerie R.
Park, The FalseClaims Act, Qui Tam Relators,and the Government: Which Is the Real
Party to the Action?, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1061, 1062-63 (1991) (arguing that the courts'

apparent inconsistency in deciding whether the United States is a real party in interest
in FCA litigation is appropriate and should continue).
242. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202; see also United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech
Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing an FCA action after determining
that it was being prosecuted by an individual and not by the federal government).
243. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202. It is settled law that states may not assert their
sovereign immunity to dismiss suits initiated by the United States. See Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) ("The Federal Government can bring suit in
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preliminary question, courts have considered whose interests are to be
vindicated, the control that each party has over the prosecution of the

action, 4 and to whom the benefits of the litigation will accrue.2 45
Courts that have addressed this question uniformly conclude that
the United States is a real party in interest, even when the government
does not intervene in the relator's action.4 Because all of the acts
that render a person liable under § 3729(a) of the FCA focus on the
use of deception to secure payment from the government, 2 courts
identify the government as the injured party who should pursue a
remedy.2 These courts buttress their conclusions as to the United
States's interest by observing that the government always exerts "substantial control" over the progress of litigation and can enjoin discovery by the relator if such discovery interferes with the government's
ongoing investigation.2 49 Courts have also found the requirement that
federal court against a State."); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965)
(stating that "nothing in [the Eleventh Amendment] or in any other provision of the
Constitution prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State's being
sued by the United States").
244. See, e.g., Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202 (listing the various factors that courts consider in determining the proper plaintiff).
245. See e.g., id.(acknowledging that although the relator does benefit financially,
the United States receives "the lion's share").
246. See id at 202-03; United States ex rel Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,
154 F.3d 870, 872-73 (8th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154
F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. CL 2387 (1999); United States ex
reL Berge v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 916 (1997); United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,
39 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex.
M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 48-49 (4th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel.
Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 999 F. Supp. 78, 83-84 (D.D.C. 1998), reversed by
Nos. 98-5133, 98-5149 & 98-5150, 1999 WL 178713, at *17 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 1999);
United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. 730 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Colo. 1990). But see
Foulds, 171 F.3d at 289, 295, overruling 980 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (distinguishing between the circuit's precedent in designating the United States as "a real
party in interest" rather than "the real party in interest" (emphasis added)).
247. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
248. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202 ("It is the government that has been injured by the
presentation of [fraudulent] claims."); Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 868 (stating that the qui
tam provisions "do not alter the underlying character of the action as one for the aggrieved party as defined by the statute"); Milam,961 F.2d at 48 ("ITihe False Claims
Act is concerned solely with false claims submitted to the government."). But see
United States ex reL Robinson v. Northrop Corp., 824 F. Supp. 830, 835 (N.D. I11.
1993) (stating that a relator suffers injury from the embarrassment of working for a
company that has perpetrated a fraud on the government and that the relator is also
injured by the emotional stress caused by the choice of keeping silent or reporting the
fraud, thus risking retaliation); United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng'g, Inc., 803 F.
Supp. 115, 119 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (stating that the relator suffers an injury by risking
the loss of her job and by decreasing the possibility of future employment in the same
industry subsequent to the initiation of an FCA action). In support of the theory that
the government, as the injured party, is the real party in interest, the Stevens court
made the additional observation that it is the government's injury that provides the
damages which the defendant must pay. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202.
249. See Stevens, 162 F3d at 202-03; Milam, 961 F.2d at 48-49 (describing the extent
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a relator commence the action to the name of the United States 0
relevant in identifying the real party in interest.251 In conjunction with
Rule 17(a), which requires that "[every] action shall be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest, ''12 2 courts reason that the United
States must be the real party in interest2 3 In addition, because the
United States receives the bulk of any recovery from an FCA action,
courts find that the United States is the real beneficiary of the litigation.2 When courts weigh all of these factors, they conclude that the
government is the real party in interest, and accordingly rule that the
defendant-state cannot assert its sovereign immunity against the
United States in an FCA suit 5
Simply determining who is the real party in interest, however, does
not satisfactorily resolve whether a state may appropriately assert a
defense of sovereign immunity in the face of an FCA action. Part IV
explains why using a real party in interest analysis is unsatisfactory,
and explains why this Note's proposed solution more closely conforms
with the Supreme Court's established federalism jurisprudence.
IV. WHY THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Is A STRAW MAN

Based on the theory that the United States is the real party in interest in FCA actions, courts have refused to let states invoke their sovereign immunity from suit. 6 By emphasizing that the United States is
"the real party in interest," and that the qui tam relator acts merely as
a "private attorney general, ''1 57 these courts inaccurately downplay the
substantial interest that qui tam relators have in the lawsuit.
A. The Real Party in InterestDoctrine Is ProceduralNot Substantive
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a), the party whose
substantive right is to be vindicated through litigation must be named
in the action.28 The policy rationale behind prosecuting all actions in
the name of the real party in interest is to protect parties from harassment and multiple suits by persons who would not otherwise be

of the government's control over the litigation).

250. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
251. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202 ("[I]t is in the government's name that the action
must be brought."); Fine, 39 F.3d at 962-63; Milam, 961 F.2d at 48; Rockwell, 730 F.

Supp. at 1035 ("[A]s qui tam plaintiffs, they have commenced suit in the name of the
government and the United States is the real party in interest.").
252. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
253. See Milam, 961 F.2d at 48.

254. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202 ("[I]t is the government that must receive the
lion's share-at least 70%-of any recovery.").

255. See supra note 246.
256. See supra note 246.
257. Milam, 961 F.2d at 49.

258. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.

1999]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FCA

217

bound by claim preclusion,259 and to allow the defense to use the tools
of discovery effectively.6" The statutory language of the FCA addresses these policy objectives and satisfies the general procedural
rule concerning real parties in interest as set forth in Rule 17(a)-the
United States is the party whose substantive rights are to be vindicated, whom the defendant has injured, and who will be bound by
collateral estoppel.
The real party in interest rule helps define the jurisdictional limitations of federal courts. In determining whether diversity jurisdiction
exists, courts will look beyond the formal or nominal parties named
and consider the citizenship of the real party in interest.761 Additionally, the second sentence of Rule 17(a) explicitly recognizes executors,
administrators, guardians, and other fiduciaries as real parties in interest.'
Accordingly, courts are correct in designating the United
States as a real party in interest in FCA litigation.
The courts' identification of the real party in interest is, however,
incomplete. These courts fail to recognize that the qui tam relator, re-

gardless of whether the United States has intervened, is also a real
party in interest. Because the relator is properly viewed as having
standing, 26 the relator should also qualify as a real party in interest. 264
259. See supra notes 224-26.
260. See Celanese Corp. of Am. v. John Clark Indus., 214 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir.
1954).
261. See Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1556, at 419-21.
262. See Fed. R Civ. P. 17(a); see also id. advisory committee's note to 1966
Amendment (noting that the purpose of the second sentence is to resolve any doubts
as to the real party in interest status of the named fiduciaries); Wright et al., supra
note 223, § 1548, at 370. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (1994) (providing that "the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of
the same State as the decedent, and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or incompetent"); Wright et al., supra note 223, § 1556, at 424 (explaining how this alters the "ordinary rule of looking to the citizenship of the real party in interest").
263. See e.g., United States ex rel Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that qui tam relator has standing to sue defendant); United States ex
reL Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir. 1993)
(same). But see United States ex reL Riley v. Saint Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 982 F.
Supp. 1261, 1267-68 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that a relator has no standing to sue
unless he can demonstrate injury in fact that is personal to him); Boese, supra note 7,
at 4-192 to 4-193 (criticizing the court's decision in Kelly). The Kelly court reasoned
that the FCA "effectively assigns the government's claims to qui tam plaintiffs." Kelly,
9 F.3d at 748. Although the word "assignment" does not appear in the text of the
FCA, the Kelly court stated that Congress "intended to assign the government's fraud
claims to individual qui tam plaintiffs in cases where [it] chooses not to pursue such
claims." Id.; cf. AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(holding that claims under Rule lb-5 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 are assignable); FDIC v. Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259,266-68 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (holding
that bank's action for fraud and malpractice is assignable to the FDIC); In re National
Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool, 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1156 (CD. Cal. 1986)
(holding that a treble damages claim under RICO is assignable). Furthermore, although such an assignment would be contingent on future events, the Kelly court
found this type of assignment to be consistent with prior case law. See Kelly, 9 F.3d at
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Although some courts have dismissed the relator's interest as solely
pecuniary, likening it to an attorney's contingency fee, 265 the FCA
statute clearly recognizes the relator's interest in FCA litigation." 6

If Congress did not intend the qui tam relator to be a real party in
interest, the statutory protections provided to relators would be superfluous. 2 67 In addition, if a relator was not a real party in interest, there
would be no way for qui tam suits to ever be prosecuted. The alterna-

tive to considering the relator as a real party in interest is to consider
the relator as a deputy of the United States.2 68 Decisions upholding
the FCA's constitutionality in the face of Appointments Clause challenges, however, foreclose this approach. 69 The fact that the United
States is a real party in interest does not preclude the qui tam relator

from also being a real party in interest. 270 Thus, finding that the
United States is the sole real party in interest in qui tam litigation, as
defined by Rule 17(a), is not only inaccurate, but it also treats the
question of the unconstitutional abrogation of a state's sovereign im748. For a discussion of other reasons that relators have standing unrelated to their
pecuniary interest in the action, see supra note 248.
264. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. Hence, the relator, like the United
States, would be a real party in interest. As a result, the United States could not be
considered the real party in interest. See United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech
Univ., 171 F.3d 279,289 n.16 (5th Cir. 1999).
265. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
162 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
266. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which
the FCA protects the relator's interest in the litigation even after the Government intervenes). The problem, as the Fifth Circuit recently identified, is determining the
specific "contours of the relationship between the qui tam plaintiff and the United
States." See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 289.
267. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
268. It is well-settled, however, that qui tam relators are not officers of the United
States. See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
269. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743,758-59 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the authority exercised by qui tam relators is not significant enough to
be equated with powers exercisable only by officers of the United States). But see
United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 1998) (Panner,
J., dissenting) (describing qui tam relators as "self-appointed 'ad hoc deputies"'
(quoting United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer
Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992)), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999); Boese,
supra note 7, at 4-185 (criticizing the Kelly court's analysis of challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA under the Appointments Clause). In addition, the Court in
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991), rejected the notion
that states could be sued by any plaintiff in the name of the United States. Instead,
the Court stated that such suits had to be "under the control of responsible federal
officers." Id. Thus, because Kelly held that qui tam relators are not officers of the
United States, qui tam relators cannot abrogate the state sovereign immunity in a suit
in the name of the United States.
270. See United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Nos. 98-5133, 98-5149
& 98-5150, 1999 WL 178713, at *11 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 1999); Foulds, 171 F.3d at 289
n.16, 291; cf United States ex rel. Felton v. Allflex, USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 259, 263
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (holding that although the United States is the real party in interest, the relator also has a substantial interest in the litigation that courts recognize
and will protect).
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munity in an unnecessarily oblique manner.
B. Rejecting a Real Party in InterestAnalysis in FCA CasesAgainst
States
If the government intervenes in an FCA suit before the complaint is
unsealed, it has "the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,
and shall not be bound by an act of the [relator]."' 71 Although the relator remains a party in the action and a full participant, the government may petition the court to limit the relator's role by demonstrating that the relator would "interfere with or unduly delay the
Government's prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment. '' m More significantly, the government has the authority to dismiss and to settle a case notwithstanding the objection of the relatorP" Thus, the government, in
cases in which it has intervened, maintains significant control over the
conduct of the litigation.
When the government chooses not to intervene, it has virtually no
control over the conduct of the relator in the FCA action.' although
the government may, with permission of the court, temporarily enjoin
discovery by the relatorPvS The purpose of the injunction is to prevent
the relator's possible interference with the government's own investigations, and does not authorize the government to meddle in the progress of the litigation. 276 Thus, should the relator prevail, the government is effectively a non-party,27 although it eventually receives most
of any recovery the relator obtains.
The "chimerical presence" of the United States in such instances
was the primary reason that the Fifth Circuit recently concluded that
the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against sovereign
states in FCA cases in which the United States has not intervened. s
According to the court in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech
University, the qui tam plaintiff's control over virtually all strategic
and tactical litigation decisions, absent the government's intervention,
is dispositive as to the question of who is prosecuting the suit z 9 Also
271. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1994).
272 Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
273. See id § 3730(c)(2)(A) & (B). If the government were to attempt to dismiss
or settle a case over the relator's objection, the relator would be permitted to demand
a hearing before the court approves the government's motion. See id.
274. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
275. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4).
276. See id.
277. See Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. 117 F.3d 154,156 (5th Cir. 1997).
278. United States ex reL Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279,291-94 (5th Cir.
1999) ("[W]hen the government chooses to remain passive, as it [has here], we s[eel
no reason to treat it as a party with standing to challenge the district court's action as
of right.").

279. See id. at 293.
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significant to the Foulds court's analysis is the relator's sole responsibility for financing the litigation.m Accordingly, the court held that in
circumstances in which the United States declines to intervene, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence bars suits against states.
As of the end of fiscal year 1998, the United States has recovered
approximately $2.085 billion from FCA actions. 8 1 Of this $2.085 billion, $2.027 billion was recovered through prosecutions conducted by
the government.' In cases that the DOJ declined to pursue, relators
recovered only approximately $58 million of the $2.085 billion.3 As
of the end of fiscal year 1998, the DOJ had pursued 337 cases, 214 and
settled or obtained judgments in more than 229 of them.2 85 In comparison, by July 1998, federal courts dismissed, or relators gave up on,
831 out of 1,117 cases in which the government chose not to intervene. 286 These statistics demonstrate that the government plays an active role in FCA litigation and suggest that it has a good grasp of the
merits of each case. Because of the DOJ's apparent skill at selecting
and prosecuting FCA actions, it would be reasonable for it to pursue a
litigation against a state, state agency, or instrumentality of a state, if it
appeared that the potential recovery exceeded potential costs.21
Congress created a dichotomy of responsibility in the FCA: when
the government intervenes, it has primary responsibility for the prosecution of the suit, and when it does not, the relator is responsible.
Courts should follow this elegant division of labor in determining who
is suing the state in an FCA action, and eschew the use of a real party
in interest analysis, which yields a more muddled answer. This dichotomy would adhere more closely to the principles that have animated the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
C. The Eleventh Amendment, Federalism,and the False ClaimsAct
Despite a tremendous amount of criticism of the Court's convoluted
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court in Seminole Tribe v.

280. See id.
281. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Fried Frank Qui Tam PageFCA Statistics (last modified Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/fcastats.
htm>.
282- See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See Boese, supra note 7, at app. H-1.
286. See id.
287. In light of evidence that the United States has been able to easily intervene in
FCA actions, it is difficult to justify allowing a relator to prosecute an action on behalf
of the federal action. Cf Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2269 (1999) (observing that
the FLSA's provisions allowing either the "United States or the individual to prosecute violations implicates a rule that the National Government must itself deem the
case of sufficient importance to take action against the state").
288. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Floridas settled the question of whether Congress can abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity using its Article I powers: it cannot, because doing so would expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction beyond the bounds described by Article fl109 This decision is
consistent with the Court's position regarding the vitality of the principles of federalism and the wide deference that it has given to states
over the past decade?'9
The Court, in Seminole Tribe, noted that Congress may only abrogate the sovereign immunity of states through the authority granted to
it in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In addition to this
limitation, Congress must unequivocally declare its intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 3 This requirement of an unequivocal
statement reflects the Court's desire to ensure that Congress will not
subject states to liability idly or accidentally. It also reflects the
Court's respect for state dignity.29
Congress enacted the FCA, like the Indian Gambling Regulatory
Act, under the authority granted to it under Article I. Therefore, it
would appear that a suit by a citizen against a state under the FCA
would be unconstitutional. Because the FCA is a qui tam action,
however, there arises a question of whether such an action should be
viewed "as a private action by an individual, and hence barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, or one brought by the United States, and
hence not barred." 295
Courts have taken a surprisingly cursory approach to the question
of the qui tam relator's and the government's rights.m There is no
doubt that Congress enacted and amended the FCA with the intention of deterring and remedying fraud, and it is reasonable to expect
that Congress intended the FCA to facilitate this goal as efficiently as
possible. As explained previously, although the United States is a
"real party in interest," the qui tam relator is as well.9 The rights that
Congress afforded the qui tam relator even after the United States in289.
290.
291.
292

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See id. at 72-73.
See supra note 212, infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-60. The Court, however, acknowledged

that states could not assert their sovereign immunity in lawsuits initiated by the fed-

eral government. See idat 71 n.14.
293. See id at 55.
294. See eg., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (noting that the "fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment" dictates the conclusion that Congress has the authority to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity only when it makes its intention unmistakably clear in the statute's language).

295. United States ex rel Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162
F.3d 195,202 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 2391 (1999).
296. See supra notes 263-65 & 268-70.
297. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 263-65 & 270.
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tervenes suggests that the qui tam relator has a continuing role in the
litigation and a substantial pecuniary interest therein.2 99 Because the
relator is properly considered a real party in interest, courts' reliance
upon the incorrect determination that the government is "the real
party in interest" to decide whether a state may assert its sovereign
immunity is inapposite.
A more useful approach to resolving whether a state may assert its
sovereign immunity in FCA actions would be to determine who is
conducting the actual litigation.3" There are only two choices: either
the government intervenes and consequently assumes "the primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action, ' 30 1 or the relator proceeds
with her statutory right "to conduct the action. ' '3° By assuming primary responsibility for the litigation, the government takes effective
control of the litigation.3 3 It has the power to settle or to dismiss the
case, but if the relator objects, the government must receive approval
from the court. 3° The government may also restrict the relator's participation in the litigation by demonstrating that the relator's actions
would "interfere with or unduly delay the Government's prosecution
of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of har3 5 If the government elects not to intervene, it can do little
assment.""
to control the relator's litigation tactics or strategy, although it must
approve any voluntary dismissal of the action. 6 If the government
intervenes and litigates the FCA action, a state should not be able to
assert its sovereign immunity as a shield to suit. If, however, the relator litigates the FCA action alone, a state should be able to assert its
sovereign immunity as a shield, despite the fact that the 3relator
liti7
gates on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the United States.
299. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text. In a time of limited judicial
resources, the fact that Congress mandated courts to conduct hearings before allowing the government to dismiss or settle a case over the relator's objections suggests

that the relator's interest in the litigation is substantial. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)
& (B) (1994).

300. This solution conforms closely to the Fifth Circuit's analysis of who commences and prosecutes an FCA action for the purposes of determining whether federal courts can exercise jurisdiction without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. See supra notes 279-80.
301. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
302. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
303. See id. § 3730(c)(1).
304. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) & (B).
305. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
306. See id. § 3730(b)(1). There is some dispute over whether the DOJ must approve all settlements. The Fifth Circuit maintains that the government has an absolute right to review settlements, see Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d
154, 160 (5th Cir. 1992), while the Ninth Circuit holds that the government may only
review settlements if they are made within the 60-day investigation period, see United
States ex reL Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994).

307. Cf.Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240,2269 (1999) (stating that although an individual could not sue a state under the FLSA to collect overtime pay in neither state
nor federal court, the United States could prosecute the action on the individual's be-
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Distinguishing between the two parties who may undertake prosecution of an FCA action conforms with the principles underlying
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The Court in Seminole Tribe
observed that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to 'preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a
State's treasury.""'3 Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Court had explained
that the Amendment's purpose was "to prevent the indignity of subjecting a [s]tate to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' ' By doing so, the Court's jealous guardianship of state sovereign immunity accords "the States the respect
owed them as members of the federation."310 Thus, a relator should
not be allowed to bring an FCA action against a state, because doing
so unnecessarily infringes upon states' sovereignty. If the alleged
fraud perpetrated by a state were monetarily significant or easily
provable, the DOJ could readily intervene and supplant the relator as
the primary plaintiff. In fact, from the statistics on qui tam recoveries
published by the DOJ, it appears that the DOJ does intervene when
the stakes of the litigation are sufficiently high or when the chances of
prevailing are sufficiently good.?
Unlike suits by individual relators, suits by the government against
a state do not disparage the dignity and respect owed the states"
The judicial resolution of a dispute between the United States and a
state, "'each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it,
and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the
other,'... but both subject to the supreme law of the land, does no
halt).
308. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,48 (1994)).
309. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,505 (1887).
310. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505). More recently, in a trio of decisions
issued consecutively, the Court has strongly voiced its continued belief in the states'
individual sovereignty within the framework of a national government and the limited
areas in which Congress can legislate. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2246 (1999)
(holding that Congress lacks the power under Article I of the Constitution to subject
nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11
(1999) (holding that the Patent Remedies Act, which subjected states to suit for patent violations, was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment because of a failure to narrowly tailor the legislation to redress
unconstitutional deprivations of property (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997))); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219,2233 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity was neither validly
abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which subjected states to suit
brought under § 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 for false and misleading advertising nor voluntarily waived by the state's activities in interstate commerce).
311. See supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
312- See United States ex reL Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
162 F.3d 195, 213 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
2391 (1999).
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violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty."' 313 The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized that the states' consent to suit 31by
4
the United States is "'inherent in the [Constitutional] convention.'
The United States's power to sue a constituent state, however, cannot be delegated.315 The Court in Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak noted that "[t]he consent, 'inherent in the convention,' to suit
by the United States-at the instance and under the control of responsible federal officers-is not consent to suit by anyone whom the
'
United States might select."316
Consequently, in cases in which the
United States declines to intervene, a relator should not be able to assert the federal government's privilege to sue states.317 Although the
FCA states that the litigation is undertaken "for the person and for
the United States Government, '31s and although the United States is
bound by the actions of the relator unless it intervenes, the relator and
the United States are not one and the same.
CONCLUSION

When courts consider whether states can invoke sovereign immunity from suit by individuals in federal court, courts should focus on
who is prosecuting the action. With this focus, the principle question
of this Note is easily answered: States should not be able to invoke
their sovereign immunity when the federal government is the principal
party responsible for prosecution of the action, and states should be
able to invoke their sovereign immunity when an individual is the
principal party responsible for prosecution of the action. The immunity of states from suit by qui tam relators does not give states free license to cheat and swindle the federal government. Under the provisions of the FCA, the United States, acting through the office of the
Attorney General, may pursue a remedy against the states. Doing so
would maintain the delicate federal-state balance that makes the
United States sui generis among nations.
313. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,400,410 (1819)).
314. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991); see Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,329 (1934) ("While... jurisdiction [over
suits by the United States against a state] is not conferred by the Constitution in express words, it is inherent in the constitutional plan." (citation omitted)); Texas, 143
U.S. at 646 (stating that consent to suit by the United States "was given by Texas
when admitted into the Union upon an equal footing in all respects with the other
States").
315. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 785.
316. Id.
317. This also adheres to the law that various circuits have developed in response
to challenges to the FCA's constitutionality with respect to the Appointments Clause.
See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1993). But
see Boese, supra note 7, at 4-185 (criticizing the Kelly court's analysis of challenges to
the constitutionality of the FCA under the Appointments Clause).
318. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994).

